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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)Q).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE No. 1
Should this Court affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law because Mr. and Mrs. Gomez failed to marshal the evidence as required by
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable appellate case
law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 1
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to a clearly erroneous standard
of review. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). An
appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without
a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1256 (Utah 1998); citations omitted) The "clearly erroneous" standard applies
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548
(UtahCtApp. 1987))
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ISSUE No. 2
Were the trial court's Finding of Fact correct that the four-year statute of
limitations started to run on October 27, 2004, when Ms. Deakin learned for the
first time in 28 years that Mr. Gomes was going to sell the house and thus, take
action inconsistent with his gift of the duplex to her?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 2
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to questions of law, fact, and a
clearly erroneous standard of review. (Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah
2002)). 'The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the
discovery rule are questions of law, which [are] review[ed] for correctness.
However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also
involves a subsidiary factual determination - the point at which a person
reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a
question of fact. Accordingly, we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the
plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries." (Spears vs. Warr, 44
P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted)
ISSUE No. 3
Did the trial court correctly find that Ms. Deakin had actual, adverse,
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a
period of greater than seven-years and that she has continuously paid the property
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taxes for the property for 28 years, and that she has made and paid for all
improvements to the property for more than seven-years?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 3
The trial court's Findings of Fact are subject to a clearly erroneous standard
of review. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). An
appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without
a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1256 (Utah 1998); citations omitted) The "clearly erroneous" standard applies
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548
(UtahCt.App. 1987))

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the Appellant to
marshal all the evidence in its argument section. Failure to marshal the evidence
requires a dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth that the Findings
of Fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
The relevant statute of limitations is four-years pursuant to U.C.A. §78-1225.
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The relevant statures for adverse possession are U.C.A. §78-12-5 to §7812- 14.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This a dispute over ownership of a duplex located in Salt Lake City, Utah
that was gifted by Mr. Gomez to Ms. Deakin in 1977. More specifically, Ms.
Deakin's action was to quiet title to the property in Ms. Deakin through theories of
adverse possession, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance/promissory estoppel,
fraud, interference with contract and contempt of court. After granting a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, the trial court held a
one-day bench trial. Following the trial, the trail court ruled that Ms. Deakin met
the all the elements to prevail on her claims of adverse possession and detrimental
reliance/promissory estoppel, thus, quieting title in her. (R. 314-325)
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On November 8, 2004, Ms. Deakin, through counsel, filed her original
Complaint to Quiet Title. (R. 1-11) On November 9, 2004, Ms. Deakin filed with
the trial court a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, with accompanying
memorandum and affidavit, pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R. 20-26, 30-47) On November 9, 2004, Ms. Deakin also filed an
Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office and a
copy with the trial court. (R. 17-19)
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The Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order sought to restrain Mr.
Gomez from selling the real estate in question and from evicting Ms. Deakin and
her tenant from the premises until the trial court had adjudicated the Compliant.
(R. 31) Mr. Gomez's attorney was personally served with the motion,
memorandum, and affidavit for a Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 33, 44) On
November 10, 2004, Mr. Gomez's attorney filed his Memorandum in Opposition
to the Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 27-29)
On November 10, 2004, the trial court heard oral argument and granted Ms.
Deakin's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to Rule 65 A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 48-50; see also Addendum, Exhibit 1 to
Appellee's Brief) The trial court restrained Mr. Gomez from evicting Ms. Deakin
from the property and from selling the property (Id.) Mr. Gomez was ordered to
appear before the trial court on November 22, 2004 for a preliminary injunction
hearing. (R. 50; see also Addendum, Exhibit 1 and 2 to Appellee's Brief)
On November 18, 2004, Mr. Gomez filed a Motion to Dismiss with an
accompanying memorandum. (R. 54-59) Ms. Deakin filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 91-106) In his Motion to
Dismiss, Mr. Gomez argued that Ms. Deakin's claim to quiet title was barred by
the four-year statute of limitations as set forth in Utah Code. Ann. §78-12-25 - the
same argument Mr. and Mrs. Gomez assert in this appeal. (R. 55-58; see
Appellant's Brief 3, 6-9) Mr. Gomez also presented a statute of frauds argument in
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his Motion to Dismiss; however, the trial denied the statute of frauds argument
when it denied the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 55-58, 91-106, 120)
The trial court denied Mr. Gomez's Motion to Dismiss finding that the
statute of limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004, the date Mr.
Gomez first put Ms. Deakin on notice of his intent to sell the property. (R. 120,
317, 320, 324; see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see
also Addendum Exhibit 2) The trial court found that Mr. Gomez admitted that
Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of a legal injury prior to October 27, 2004.
(R. 319,320, 324)
On November 22, 2004, the trial court held the Preliminary Injunction
Hearing pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 72-74)
Ms. Deakin and her attorney were present. (Id.) Mr. Gomez failed to appear for
the hearing though he was ordered by the trial court to appear. (R. 55-58, 72-74)
Mr. Gomez's attorney was present at the hearing. (Id.) Pursuant to Rule 65A of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court heard testimony and received
documentary evidence. (Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing; see also
Addendum Exhibits 2 and 3).
The trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Deakin and Mr. Ed Aho stating
Mr. Gomez had gifted the property to Ms. Deakin, and she had openly and
adversely held the property for the more than seven years. (R. 72-74; see
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum,
Exhibit 2) The trial court also received documentary evidence showing Ms.
6

Deakin had paid the taxes, paid the mortgage payments, and paid for all
improvements to the property for the past 28 years. (R. 72-74; see Transcript of
Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibits 2, 3, and
4) On November 22, 2004, the trial court granted Ms. Deakin's Preliminary
Injunction and the matter was set for trail. (R. 72-74; Transcript of Preliminary
Injunction Hearing)
During the course of this case, the Complaint and the Answer were
amended several times by stipulation. (R. 114-115, 148-169, 210-233, 245-248)
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not attend any of the pre-trial hearings in this
matter. (R. 72-74, 314)
On February 25, 2005, this matter came before the trial court for a bench
trial. (R. 314) Ms. Deakin and her attorney and Mr. Gomez and his attorney were
present at the trial. (R. 314) Mrs. Gomez failed to appear at the trial. (R. 314) All
of the evidence and testimony admitted at the respective Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction hearings were admitted for the purpose of the
bench trial pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 314)
After hearing and receiving the parties' stipulations of fact and hearing the
testimony of various witnesses, and receiving evidence, the trial court found in
favor of Ms. Deakin on her claims of adverse possession and detrimental
reliance/promissory estoppel. (R. 314-325) The trial court quieted title to the
property to Ms. Deakin. (R. 306, 314-325; see Addendum Exhibits 5 and 6)

7

C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT
On April 5, 2005, the trial court issued its initial Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order quieting title to the property to Ms. Deakin (R.
264-277) The trial court specifically found that Ms. Deakin had prevailed on her
claim for quiet title by adverse possession and her claim of detrimental
reliance/promissory estoppel. (R. 264-277)
On April 15, 2005, Mr. Gomez, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact with an accompanying memorandum. (R. 285-291) In his
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Mr. Gomez asked the trial court to add a
findings that the Statute of Limitations defense raised in Defendants5 pleadings
was denied based upon detrimental reliance by Plaintiff (R. 285) Ms. Deakin
opposed the Motion to Amend arguing that the trial court had already denied the
defendants' the Statute of Limitations argument and ruled on the issue three
different times - at the Preliminary Injunction hearing, the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, and at trial. (R. 292-297; see also R. 120, 317, 320, 324; see Transcript
of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum) The trial court
consistently ruled that the Statute of Limitations did not start to run until October
27, 2004. (Id.) Ms. Deakin also argued that Mr. Gomez was preparing for an
appeal by requesting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be amended.
(R. 292-297)
On June 3, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Amend.
(R. 314) The trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and the trial court amended
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its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 3, 2005 to include a
statement on the Statute of Limitations commencing to run on October 27, 2004.
(R. 314-325) The trial court's unpublished opinion can be found on pages 314325 of the record as well as a copy of the June 3, 2005 Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 6.
RELEVANT FACTS
From 1973 to 1993, Mr. Gomez engaged in a prolonged romantic
relationship with Ms. Deakin while he was married to Ramona Gomez. (R. 316,
Admitted Facts 319, 320; see also Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing)
Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin a number of expensive gifts during their 20 year
relationship, including two automobiles, a ring, love letters, and a duplex. (R. 314,
320) In 1976, Mr. Gomez told Ms. Deakin that he wanted to improve her living
conditions so she could have a better quality of life. (R. Admitted Facts 319)
In 1977, Mr. Gomez bought a duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman
Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Ms. Deakin (R. 316) In April 1977, Mr.
Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys to the duplex, and he gave her possession and
exclusive control of the duplex. (R. 316) Ms. Deakin testified that Mr. Gomez
told her the house was hers, and she could do with it as she chose. (R. 316) When
Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys, possession, and exclusive control of the
duplex, he told her to pay the mortgage to the mortgage company, to pay the taxes
through the mortgage escrow account, to pay for all of the improvements, to pay
for all of the utility bills, and so forth. (R. 316)
9

Sometime after 1977, Mr. Gomez added his wife, Ramona Gomez, to the
Certificate of Title. (R. 316) Though Ms. Deakin states that the Certificate of Title
speaks for itself, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez offered a copy of the Certificate of
Title or a copy of the Mortgage or any such evidence at trial proving that they are
in fact the recorded titleholders of the property in question. (R. 316) Mr. and Mrs.
Gomez did not submit any evidence to the trial court which would indicate that
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time or that she ever took any
action in the property. (R. 316)
Since 1977, Ms. Deakin has acted consistently with her position as owner
of the property in regard to paying the mortgage, the taxes, the improvements, and
the utility bills. (R. 317, 320, 321) For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has relied on Mr.
Gomez's commitment and statements that the property was hers. (R. 317) She
believed in good faith that Mr. Gomez had given the property to her. (R. 321)
For nearly 28 years, Ms. Deakin has leased the other half of the duplex to
tenants v/ithout any restraint, objections, or requirements from Mr. or Mrs.
Gomez. (R. Admitted Facts 319) Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never been in
any lease agreement with Ms. Deakin or any tenant to the property. (R. Admitted
Facts 319) Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez has ever asked or required Ms. Deakin
for an accounting of the collected rents, the mortgage payments, the tax payments,
or the improvements or to make the payments to them. (R. 317, R. Admitted Facts
319-320)
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Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316) Nonetheless, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez
numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in her name as he had
promised. (R. 317) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say,
"I'll get around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317; see Transcript of
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, p. 11-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) Ms.
Deakin has never made such requests in writing because she relied on Mr.
Gomez's promise that he would get around to putting title in to her name. (R. 317)
The parties did not consider a formal deed to be essential to completing the gift.
(R. 317)
For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has paid for all of the improvements to the
property. (R. 316-322) She has made and paid for the following improvements to
the duplex: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings,
tore down garages, new 220 volt electrical wiring, new air conditioning units, new
water heaters, new light fixtures, new ceiling fans, new carpet, several costs of
new paint, new storm doors, several new stoves, several new refrigerators, and
new pipes and drains for clothes washers. (R. 318) The trial court received into
evidence that Ms. Deakin paid for these repairs. (R. 318) Ms. Deakin never
requested permission from Mr. Gomez to do any of these repairs, because she
relied on his statements that the property was hers. (R. 318) On one occasion, Ms.
Deakin did ask Mr. Gomez for financial assistance for a repair, but he refused
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because he told her that the house was hers and she could do with it as she pleased.
(R.318)
Mr. Gomez testified to the following: He did not pay for any of the
improvements to the house listed above. (R. Admitted Facts 319., 320) He did not
know that the garages had been torn down within the past ten years. (R. 320; Trial
Transcript p. 55) He has not paid for, known of, or made any improvements to the
house for the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) He did not even know
that the locks to the house had been changed. (Trial Transcript p. 55-57) He has
not visited the property within the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55)
Since 1977, Ms. Deakin has paid all of the taxes on the property. (R. 317,
321) Mr. Gomez admitted that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez ever paid the property
taxes for the duplex. (R. 316-318, R. Admitted Facts 319, R. 320) Mr. Gomez
admitted that all mortgage payments and tax notices have been sent to 468 E.
Sherman Ave., where Ms. Deakin resides. (R. Admitted Facts 319)
For 28 years, Ms. Deakin has relied on Mr. Gomez's commitment and
statements that the property was hers. (R. 317) She believed in good faith that
Mr. Gomez had given the property to her. (R. 321) Ms. Deakin has paid all the
mortgage payments, improvements, and taxes for 28 years. (R. 316-321) Mr. and
Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or occupied the property in question. (R.
Admitted Facts 319) Ms. Deakin never heard anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's
commitment that the property was hers until October 27, 2004 when Mr. Gomez's
real estate agent abruptly informed Ms. Deakin he was selling the property. (R.
12

317) This was the first action inconsistent with Mr. Gomez's gift of the property.
(R.317)
Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed
Ms. Deakin that he was going to sell the property. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320)
Mr. Gomez admitted that Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury
prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320)
The trial court found:
Based on all of the evidence and the Court's evaluation
of the demeanor and credibility of Plaintiff and
Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court
further finds based on clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant
Mr. Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the
parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by Defendant
Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and
Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 years, Defendant
did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April
1977 and the Plaintiff reasonably believed in good
faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted
in good faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover,
acting upon her belief that such a gift had been made,
the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial
improvements to the property along with paying the
costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage
on the property for 28 years. Further, the Court finds,
that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time
would be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to
Plaintiff who, for 28 years has detrimentally relied
upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her
by Defendant Mr. Gomez. (R. 321-322)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, this Court should affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law because the Appellants failed to marshal the evidence as
required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable
appellate case law. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have not marshaled the evidence to
demonstrate why the trial court's specific finding that the statute of limitations
began to run on October 27, 2004 was in error. Furthermore, Appellants have not
marshaled any evidence to explain why the trial court's findings and conclusions
that Ms. Deakin met the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse
possession should be reversed.
Second, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that the statute of
limitations commenced to run on October 27, 2004. In Appellant's brief, Mr. and
Mrs. Gomez do not give any reasons, cite to any evidence, or cite to any detailed
finding of fact to support their claim that all the elements to prove a cause of
action were present in 1978. Mr. Gomez completely ignores his admission that
prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he was going to
sell the house. For 28 years, she detrimentally relied on his statements that the
house was hers. Since 1977, she acted consistently with Mr. Gomez's statements
that she was responsible to pay for the mortgage, the taxes, the utilities, and all
improvements to the property. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin any
notice of legal injury prior to October 27, 2004.

14

Third, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions
that Ms. Deakin has met the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and
adverse possession. She has shown that in 1993, Mr. Gomez ended their
relationship. Since 1993, she has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious,
visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a period of seven-years or
greater. She has continuously paid the property taxes on the property during a
period exceeding seven-years, and she has made and paid for all improvements to
the property.
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE No. 1
MR. AND MRS. GOMEZ FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE AND APPLICABLE APPELLATE CASE LAW TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD BE REVERSED.
THUS,
APPELLANTS' APPEAL MUST FAIL, AND THE FINDINGS AFFIRMED.
If the appellant has not met the marshalling requirement, the appellate court
is required to affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and the appeal must fail.
(Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 312 (Utah 1998); see also Johnson vs.
ffigley, 989 P.2d 61, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)). The trial court's Findings of Fact
must be affirmed and this appeal must fail because Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not
marshal the evidence to demonstrate why the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law are clearly erroneous. There are clear procedural requirements outlined in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
applicable case law for marshalling the evidence.
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure states:
[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(9) An Argument. The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented ... A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.
(Utah R. App. P. 24(a))

This Court has held that the appellant must clearly marshal the evidence in
the "argument section" of appellant's brief. (Fitzgerald vs. Critchfield, 744 P.2d
301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)) "To comply with the marshalling requirement,
appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at the point at which they
challenge the factual finding." (Roderick vs. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002))
The marshalling requirement, which is to be found in the argument section of the
brief, is "neither elective nor optional." (Fitzgerald vs. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301,
304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987))
The marshalling requirement entails a "listing [of[ all the evidence
supporting the finding that is challenged. Once the evidence is listed ... with
appropriate citations to the record, the appellant must then show that the
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings ..." (Judge
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Nomian H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review: Revised," 12 Utah Bar
18,13(1999))
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate is to be read in conjunction with
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) states, "Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
In interpreting Rule 52, the Utah Supreme Court has held an appellate court
"will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless
they are .. . clearly erroneous." (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998); citations omitted) The Court of Appeals will review the trial court's
conclusions of law "for correctness, according the trial court no particular
deference." (Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256). The "clearly erroneous" standard applies
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. (Baker vs. Francis, 741 P.2d 548
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) If the appellant has not met the marshalling requirement,
the appellate court is required to affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and
the appeal must fail. (Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); see
also Johnson vs. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)).
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez fail to marshal any of the extensive oral and
documentary evidence taken at the Temporary Restraining Order hearing, the
Preliminary Injunction hearing, or at the bench trial in their argument section.
(Appellants' Brief 3, 6-10) The trial court relied on the testimony, documentary
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evidence, and pleadings presented at each of these proceedings to make its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 314) However, in lieu of
marshalling the evidence, Mr. and Mrs. Gomezs' brief first reargues their position
that the four year statute of limitations bars Ms. Deakin's claims. (Appellant's
Brief 6-9) The trial court rejected the Gomezs' statute of limitations argument at
least three times - first, at the Preliminary Injunction hearing (Transcript of
Preliminary Injunction p. 111-122), second, on Mr. Gomez's Motion to Dismiss
(R. 54-59, 91-106, 120), and third, at trial (R. 314-325).
After the trial court entered its initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in April 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Gomez filed a Motion to Amend the Findings of
Fact for a specific finding to add a paragraph finding that the Statute of
Limitations defense raised in Defendants' pleadings was denied based upon
detrimental reliance by Plaintiff. (R. 285) On June 3, 2005, the trial court amended
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to include a statement on the Statute
of Limitations commencing to run on October 27, 2004. (R. 320, 321, 324)
The trial court specifically found Ms. Deakin never heard anything contrary
to Mr. Gomez's commitment that the property was hers until October 27, 2004
when Mr. Gomez's real estate agent informed Ms. Deakin he was selling the
property. (R. 317; Transcript of Preliminary Injunction p. 111-114) This was the
first action inconsistent with his gift of the property. (R. 317) Mr. Gomez
admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he
was going to sell the property. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) Mr. Gomez admitted
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that Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to October 27,
2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320)
None of these facts appears in the Appellants' argument section to marshal
the evidence as to why the trial court's findings should be reversed. (Appellant's
Brief 6-9) Not only do Appellants fail to marshal any evidence as to the findings
that the statute of limitations began to run on October 27, 2004, but they also do
not marshal any evidence for their argument that the adverse possession finding
must be reversed. (Appellant's Brief 10)
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez simply make a blanket assertion without any citation
to the record that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Deakin gained title to the
property through adverse possession. (Appellant's Brief 10) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez
ignore the findings and conclusions that Ms. Deakin had actual, adverse,
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a
period greater than seven years, and she paid for all taxes and improvements to the
property for the past 28 years. (R. 316-325) Mr. Gomez has not visited the
property, made any improvements thereto, and he was not aware of any of the
improvements Ms. Deakin made to the property - especially her changing the
locks on the doors. (R. 320; see Trail Transcript 55-57) Because Mr. and Mrs.
Gomez have failed to marshal the evidence, the appellate court is required to
affirm that the Findings of Fact are correct, and the appeal must fail. (Valcarce vs.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); see also Johnson vs. Higley, 989 P.2d
61(UtahCt.App. 1999)).
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ISSUE No. 2
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED THAT THE
FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTED TO RUN ON
OCTOBER 27, 2004, WHEN MS. DEAKIN LEARNED FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN 28 YEARS THAT MR. GOMES WAS GOING TO SELL THE
HOUSE AND THUS, TAKE ACTION INCONSISTENT WITH HIS GIFT
OF THE DUPLEX TO HER.
The statute of limitations for oral contracts is four years. (TJ.C.A. §78-1225) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez argue that the Mr. Gomez entered into an oral contract
with Ms. Deakin in 1976 and that the statute of limitations ran in 1982 thus,
barring Ms. Deakin's suit. (Appellant's Brief p. 3, 6) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez assert
their argument without any citation to the record. Furthermore, Mr. Gomez did
not own the property in 1976, thus, an oral contract could not have been formed in
1976, and the statute of limitations could not commence to run in 1976.
Ms. Deakin counters that the trial court correctly found that statute of
limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004, the date that Mr.
Gomez's real estate agent abruptly informed Ms. Deakin that Mr. Gomez was
selling the property. (R. 317; Transcript of Preliminary Injunction p. 111-115)
Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Ms.
Deakin that he was going to sell the house. (R. Admitted Facts 320) Ms. Deakin
did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted
Facts 320) None of these correct and relevant facts appear in the Appellants'
argument section to marshal the evidence as to why the trial court's findings
should be reversed. (Appellant's Brief 6-9)
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Though Mr. and Mrs. Gomez and Ms. Deakin cite different case law in
their respective briefs, each agree, the statute of limitations begins to mn when the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action arises. (Spears vs. Warr, 44
P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted) The Supreme Court and this Court
have articulated exceptions to the last event necessary rale, where, "the discovery
rule tolls the limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action
are discovered (Id.) In the case of Spears vs. Warr, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
The discovery rale applies (1) in situations where the
discovery rale is mandated by statute; (2) in situations
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause
of action because of the defendant's concealment or
misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rale would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant
has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Under the discovery rale, the limitations period does
not begin to ran until the discovery of facts forming
the basis for the cause of action.
(Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002);
citations omitted)

It is undisputed that the first scenario where the discovery rale is mandated
by statute is inapplicable to this case. However, the second scenario where a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
misleading conduct is applicable to this case.
During the course of their relationship, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez
numerous times to have the title of the duplex put in her name as he had promised.
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(R. 317, See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also
Addendum) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say, "I'll get
around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317, see Transcript of Preliminary
Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) Vis. Deakin never
made such requests in writing because she relied on Mr. Gomez's promise that he
would get around to putting title in to her name. (R. 317) The parties did not
consider a formal deed to be essential to completing the gift. (R. 317)
Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316, see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction
Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) For 28 years, Mr. Gomez led
Ms. Deakin to believe that he had made a gift of the duplex to her. (R. 321; see
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum,
Exhibit 2) He caused her to rely on his statements that he would get around to
putting the title of the duplex in her name as he promised. (R. 321, see Transcript
of Preliminary Injunction Hearing p. 111-115; see also Addendum Exhibit 2) In
reliance upon Mr. Gomez's assurances, Ms. Deakin continued to act consistently
with her good faith belief that Mr. Gomez had given her the property by paying
the mortgage, the taxes, insurance, and for improvements for 28 years. (R. 321)
It is critical to remember that Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27,
2004, he had not informed Ms. Deakin that he was going to sell the property. (R.
Admitted Facts 319, 320) Ms. Deakin did not receive any notice of legal injury
prior to October 27, 2004. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) Again, none of these
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facts appears in Appellants' argument section. Appellants completely ignore the
facts - especially their admitted facts. (R. Admitted Facts 319, 320) If the statute
of limitations was to have run prior to October 27, 2004, it was tolled because Mr.
Gomez mislead Ms. Deakin and caused her to rely upon his words.
The third scenario of exceptional circumstances is also applicable to Ms.
Deakin 5s case, "where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action."
(Spears vs. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002); citations omitted) After
receiving all the testimony and evidence from the Temporary Restraining Order
hearing, the Preliminary Injunction hearings, and from the trial, the trial court
found:
Based on all of the evidence and the Court's evaluation
of the demeanor and credibility of Plaintiff and
Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court
further finds based on clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant
Mr. Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the
parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by Defendant
Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and
Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28 years, Defendant
did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April
1977 and the Plaintiff reasonably believed in good
faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted
in good faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover,
acting upon her belief that such a gift had been made,
the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial
improvements to the property along with paying the
costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage
on the property for 28 years. Further, the Court finds,
that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time
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would be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to
Plaintiff who, for 28 years has detrimentally relied
upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her
by Defendant Mr. Gomez. (R. 321-322)
The trial court correctly found that it would be inequitable, or in other
words unjust, to revoke or rescind the gift, especially given Ms. Deakin's'
detrimental reliance and good faith actions for 28 years. (R. 321-322) Thus, if the
statute of limitations was to have expired prior to October 27, 2004, it was tolled
because of the exceptional circumstances and the unjust result it would cause.
The trial court's findings that the statutory period began to run on October
27, 2004 should be affirmed because Mr. Gomez led Ms. Deakin to believe he
gifted the house to her, he led her to believe he would transfer title in her name,
and he caused her to believe that by paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the
improvements the house was hers. Mr. Gomez admitted that he did not tell Ms.
Deakin prior to October 27, 2004 that he was going to sell the house. (R. 314-325;
see Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing 111-115; see also Addendum
Exhibit 2). Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not give Ms. Deakin any notice of legal
injury prior to October 27, 2004. (R. 320) It would be unjust to revoke the gift
after Ms Deakin has paid the mortgage, the taxes, and all improvements for 28
years. This Court should affirm the trial court's findings.
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ISSUE No. 3
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED THAT
MS. DEAKIN HAD ACTUAL, ADVERSE, EXCLUSIVE, OPEN,
NOTORIOUS, VISIBLE, CONTINUOUS, AND
UNDISTURBED
POSSESSION FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAN SEVEN-YEARS.
SHE HAS CONTINUOUSLY PAID THE PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE
PROPERTY FOR 28 YEARS, AND SHE HAS MADE AND PAID FOR ALL
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROPERTY FOR M O R E THAN SEVEN
YEARS.
Ms. Deakin claims quiet title by adverse possession not founded on a
written instrument. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez make a blanket statement that "the
conclusion of law based on adverse possession is unsupported by the facts"
without marshalling any evidence to support their argument. (Appellants' Brief p.
10) The record on appeal and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
support the trial court's finding of adverse possession. (R. 314-235)
A. Elements for Adverse Possession
Ms. Deakin asserts title by adverse possession not founded on a written
instrument. One who claims title by adverse possession must bring themselves
within the statutory provisions. (Jenkins vs. Morgan, 196 P.2d 871 (Utah 1948)
"Possession of the real property is presumed to be in the legal title holder and that
occupancy by any other is deemed to be subordinate to that title unless the
occupant can show that the property has been held and possessed adversely for
seven-years." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); U.C.A. §78-12-7)
"It is widely recognized that in order to show successful adverse possession, the
claimant must intend to acquire title, must by declaration or conduct give actual or
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constructive notice to the legal title holder, and must possess the property in a
manner variously called 'open,' 'notorious,' or 'hostile5 for a period of seven
years." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); U.C.A. §78-12-7, 7812-10, 78-12-11, 78-12-12) "In order for a claimant to give notice, it must be
conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the owner." (Olwell vs. Clark, 658
P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982) The claimant must also have paid all taxes levied
against the property for seven-years prior to filing the action. (U.C.A. §78-12-12)
B. Legal Title
The person establishing legal title to the property is presumed to be the
owner unless it appears that a person has held and possessed adversely to such
right for a period of seven-years. (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah
1982); IXCA, §78-12-7)
In the present case, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez marshaled any evidence
that they are in fact the legal title holders to 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt
Lake City, Utah. (R. 316; see Appellant's Brief 10) In 1977, Mr. Gomez bought
the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, as a
gift for Ms. Deakin (R. 316) In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the keys
to the duplex, and he gave her possession and exclusive control of the house. (R.
316) Ms. Deakin testified that Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers, and she
could do with it as she chose. (R. 316) When Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Deakin the
keys, possession, and exclusive control of the duplex, he told her to pay the
mortgage to the mortgage company, to pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow
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account, to pay for all of the improvements, to pay for all of the utility bills, and so
forth. (R. 316)
Sometime after 1977, Mr. Gomez added his wife, Ramona Gomez, to the
Certificate of Title. (R. 316) Though Ms. Deakin states that the Certificate of Title
speaks for itself, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez offered a copy of the Certificate of
Title or a copy of the Mortgage or any such evidence during any of the hearings or
at trial proving that they are in fact the recorded titleholders of the property in
question. (R. 316) Mr. and Mrs. Gomez did not submit any evidence to the trial
court which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any
time or that she ever took any action in the property. (R. 316)
Ms. Deakin is an unsophisticated, uninformed, and inexperienced person
when it comes to real estate. (R. 316) Nonetheless, Ms. Deakin asked Mr. Gomez
numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in her name as he had
promised. (R. 317) Each time she followed up with him, Mr. Gomez would say,
"I'll get around to it, babe, I'll get around to it." (R. 317) Ms. Deakin has relied
on Mr. Gomez's promise that he would get around to putting title in to her name.
(R. 317)
Ms. Deakin has held herself out as the owner of the house. (R. 316-325)
The trial court received into evidence Ms. Deakin's testimony and copies of
canceled checks for at least the past 20 years proving her payment of the mortgage
and taxes. (R. 314-317) At the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Mr. Ed Alio
testified that Ms. Deakin has always claimed to be the owner of the duplex. (R.
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316; see also Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing) The clear weight of
the evidence shows Ms. Deakin has held the property for the past 28 years. (R.
316-319)
C. Open, Notorious, Continuous, Adverse, Hostile, Exclusive Possession with
Notice of Adverse Interests and Improvements (Olwell vs. Clark, 658 P.2d
585, 587 (Utah 1982))
In 1993, Mr. Gomez ended his relationship with Ms. Deakin. (R. 3175 319,
320) Thus, the elements of hostility, adverseness, open, notorious, exclusive
possession, and notice of adverse interests commenced.
Mr. Gomez testified to the following: He did not pay for any of the
improvements to the house listed above. (R. Admitted Facts 319. 320) He did not
know that the garages had been torn down within the past ten years. (R. 320; Trial
Transcript p. 55) He has not paid for, known of, or made any improvements to the
house for the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55) He did not know that
the locks to the house had been changed. (Trial Transcript p. 55-57) He has not
visited the property within the past ten years. (R. 320, Trial Transcript p. 55)
Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Gomez have ever occupied or possessed the duplex. (R.
Admitted Facts 319) Because Mrs. Gomez did not appear at any of the
proceedings in this case, it is questionable whether she ever knew of the duplex
and Mr. Gomez's romantic relationship with Ms. Deakin.
Mr. and Mrs. Gomez argue that they were not put on notice of an adverse
interest. (Appellant's Brief p. 10) However, they do not marshal any evidence to
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support their claim. (Id.) The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the requirement
that notice, whether actual or constructive, must be given. (Olwell vs. Clark, 658
P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982) "In order for a claimant to give notice, it must be
conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the owner." (Olwell at 587)
Since at least 1993, when Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Ms. Deakin, she
has taken the following actions: she tore down the garages, she changed the locks,
new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings, new 220 volt
electrical wiring, new air conditioning units, new water heaters, new light fixtures,
new ceiling fans, new carpet, several costs of new paint, new storm doors, several
new stoves, several new refrigerators, and new pipes and drains for clothes
washers. (R. 318) The trial court received into evidence proof that Ms. Deakin
paid for these repairs and improvements. (R. 315, 318) Ms. Deakin never
requested pemiission from Mr. Gomez to do any of these repairs. (R. 318) On one
occasion, Ms. Deakin did ask Mr. Gomez for financial assistance for a repair, but
he refused because he told her that the house was hers, and she could do with it as
she pleased. (R. 318) Ms. Deakin's conduct is clearly inconsistent with the rights
of Mr. and Mrs. Gomez. She has made significant and substantial changes to and
improvements to the duplex. Mr. Gomez has been on notice, but neither he nor his
wife have visited or taken any interest in the property since at least 1993. (R. 320)
Ms. Deakin's conduct has been inconsistent with the rights and interests of Mr.
and Mrs. Gomez for more than seven-years.
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D. Taxes
The claimant must have paid all taxes levied against the property for sevenyears prior to filing the action. (TJ.C.A. §78-12-12) Mr. Gomez admitted that he
has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex. (R. Admitted Facts 319,
320) Mrs. Gomez also has not paid property taxes for the duplex. (Id.) Ms.
Deakin has paid the taxes along the mortgage payments for more than seven-years.
(R. 315-317, 319-324) The copies of all of Ms. Deakin's cancelled checks for the
past 20-years clearly proves that Ms. Deakin has paid all taxes levied and assessed
against the property. (R. 314-325; see Transcript to Preliminary Injunction
Hearing)
The trial court correctly found and concluded that:
... the statutory and case law elements for quiet title
and adverse possession have been met by Plaintiff in
that she has shown that she was given the property in
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse,
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and
undisturbed possession for a period of seven-years or
greater and that she has continuously paid the property
taxes on the property during a period exceeding sevenyears, and that she has made and paid for
improvements to the property. (R. 322)

For the reasons stated above, the trial court's findings and conclusions
should be affirmed on the issue of adverse possession.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez failed to marshal the evidence as required by Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, Appellant's appeal must fail, and the Findings
of Fact affirmed. The trial court correctly found in accordance with Mr. Gomez's
admission that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until October 27, 2004
when Ms. Deakin learned for the first time that Mr. Gomez intended to sell the duplex.
The trial court also correctly found and concluded that Ms. Deakin met all of the
elements of adverse possession, and thus, the trial court quieted title in her.

June 7, 2006

Respectfully Submitted,

Christian W. Clinger
Attorney for Appellee Marjean Deakin
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARJEAN A DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER

vs.

Case No: 040923578 PR

BERNARD GOMEZ,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
November 10, 2004
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PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CHRISTIAN W CLINGER
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES H. DEANS
Video
Tape Number:
video
Tape Count: 12 04

HEARING
TAPE: video
COUNT: 12 04
On record counsel only are present to argue plaintiff's Motion for
a Temp Restraining Order. The court grants the motion for a
temporary restraining order and a bond must be posted for $15,000
by the plaintiff within a week.
The court orders a Preliminary Injunction Hearing on November 22,
2004 @ 11:00 a.m.
PRELIM INJUNCTION is scheduled.
Date: 11/22/2004
Time: 11: 00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W35
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY

Paqe 1 (last)

\l rV

FILE!I DISTRICT COURT
NOV f 2 m
CLINGER LEE CLINGER, LLC
CHRISTIAN W. CLINGER (8695)
9117 West 2700 South, Ste. A
Magna, UT 84044
Telephone: (801) 250-8200
Facsimile: (801) 250-8201
Attorneys for Plaintiff Marjean Deakin

By.

S
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Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
MARJEAN A. DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARD GOMEZ,
Defendant

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
Case No.: 040923578
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to
Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came before this Court on November 10, 2004.
Christian W. Ginger, counsel for Plaintiff, and James Deans, counsel for Defendant, were
present. After reviewing the pleadings submitted and after hearing oral argument from
Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's counsel, the Court finds that there is substantial harm posed
to Plaintiff. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
should be and the same herein granted.

IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT THAT,
1. Defendant Bernard Gomez and his real estate agents, ERA Legacy Realtors, are
restrained from the following activities:

a. Evicting Plaintiff and Plaintiffs tenant from the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E.
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah; and,
b. Entering on, inspecting, and selling the real estate in question located at 468 E. and
470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah; and,
c. Defendant and his real estate agents, ERA Legacy Realtors, and any prospective
buyers are restrained from direct contact with the Plaintiff. All communications shall be
directed through the Parties' attorneys.
2. Plaintiff is ordered to post a bond in the amount of $15,000.00 with the Court by 5:00
p.m. on November 18, 2004 as security pursuant to Rule 65 A U.R.C.P. If Plaintiff cannot post
the bond by November 18, 2004, Plaintiffs counsel is required to inform the Court and opposing
counsel.
3. The parties and their attorneys are ordered to appear before this Court on November
22, 2004 at 11:00 a.m., courtroom W35, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 450 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah for a review hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order and a
determination whether the Temporary Restraining Order shall be rrfade g ^ ^ a f t s n t injunction.
Dated November JjL_>

2004

The
Thin
Approved to form and content:
/

ru^

Dated: November 11, 2004
Christian W. Clinger
Attorney for Plaintiff Marjean Deakin

/i5a/ed: November f f , 2004
ST-ames Deans
Attorney for Defendant Bernard Gomez
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Oo

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARJEAN A. DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BERNARD GOMEZ,
Defendant.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
November 10, 2004

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING

^&&8S&&

November 22, 2004
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
NOV 1S 2005
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByDeputy Clerk

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
District Court Judge

Jen Kearbey
Certified Court Transcriber
12.30 Gaylene Circle
Sandy Utah 84094
r~

\
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"

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

]
]

ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ]

I, JERI KEARBEY, Certified Court Transcriber in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing electronically-recorded
proceedings were transcribed by me from CDs furnished by the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah;

That pages 1 through 123, both inclusive, represent a full,
true and correct transcript of the proceedings had on November 10 & 22,
2004, and that said transcript contains all of the evidence, objections of
counsel and rulings of the Court, and all matters to w h i c h the same relate.

DATED this 8th day of November 2005.
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1 obviously, expecting the follow-up of a deed.

Let's just

2 suppose that Ms. Deakin had, as they say —
THE COURT: Well, not only expecting it, he promised

3

4 that he was going to do that.
MR. DEANS:

5

At this point in the evidence, that's —

6 and that's actually favorable to the statute of limitations.
7 Let's

make

that

assumption,

because

it's

8 Mr. Gomez not being here today, Your Honor.

unrebutted

by

I had asked him

9 to be and I got a call this morning that he wasn't coming,
10 and —
THE COURT:

11

You're fighting a difficult battle when

12 your client doesn't come to respond—
13

MR. DEANS:

I know.

14

THE COURT: — to the allegations, basically, of the

15 complaint.
16

MR. DEANS:

17

THE COURT:

18 about.

I understand that.
Let me tell you what

I'm

concerned

There are a number of theories that I think — legal

19 theories that the parties could have in this case.

And we're

20 early in the case in terms of pleadings, and so they may or
21 may not be modified to incorporate all the theories.

But just

22 listening to the facts that have come in today, one-sided
23 primarily facts, admittedly, my concern is you have a client
24 who has made a promise that he's going to put a title into her
25 name.

She's followed up.

He says, "I'm going to get around
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1 to it.

I'll get around to it."

And he's reiterated that on

2 a number of occasions.
She is an uninformed, unsophisticated person when it

3

4 comes to real property and taxes, and she's doing what she was
5 told that she had to do as a part of this arrangement; and
6 that

is

pay

the

mortgage

payments,

pay

the

improvement

7 payments, rent the property, receive the rents, pay all the
8 bills indicated,

so forth.

And so she has, I think in Mr.

9 d i n g e r ' s words, she's detrimentally relied for 28 years on
10 the commitment.

She never hears anything

contrary

to that

11 commitment until this year, when, all of a sudden, it appears
12 that your client no longer is going to do what he told her he
13 was going to do.
And I would assume that he could get around to it

14

15 any time up until the mortgage was paid off, maybe, but he
16 hasn't.
17 back."
18

And now he comes in and says,

"I want the property

That's how I see the facts in this case.
Now,

I see another

theory

as adverse

possession.

19 She moves in, she's told it's hers; he says, "Okay."
20 like it's hers.

She acts

She does everything that an owner, but again,

21

an unsophisticated owner, would do for all these years.

22

all of a sudden, he comes back and says, "I'm going to sell

23

the property and you don't have any right here.

24

three days to get out."

25

I think you have a very steep hill

And,

You've got

to climb with
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1

those facts to try to maintain your position.

2

got a statute of limitations argument.

3

that, as far as triggering the statute in the detrimental

4

reliance, there's nothing that would trigger it until he says,

5

"I'm not going to —you've got to get out."

6

time she knows that he's not going to live up to h e r — his

7

promise to her.

8

statute.

9

And that's recent.

I know you've

My concern would be

That's the first

That's well within the

As far as the adverse possession, I don't see a

10

statute running on adverse possession.

It's — I mean, she

11

has — she has to establish that she was at least seven years

12

adverse, open, notorious, paying

13

doing, either directly or indirectly

14

again, I think that's a tough one to argue.

taxes, which

she's

been

for that time.

So,

15

If you're just going under breach of contract and

16

you're proposing that there was some contract that was created

17

back in 1977, you may have an argument.

18

arguments on detrimental reliance, which I see being asserted,

19

and adverse possession, which I see being asserted are — are

20

possible arguments.

But I think the

21

I think there's another theory that I haven't heard

22

yet except maybe indirectly with some of the references, and

23

that's fraud.

24

give this to you.

25

back and he waits for 25 — 27 years, whatever it is, and then

That he fraudulently told her, "I'm going to
You make the payments."

And then he sits
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1 he comes m
2 back

and says, "Now I'm going to take the property

And I didn't give you the deed

Too bad."

You know9

3 So I think there's-- there's some pretty heavy causes of
4 action that the plaintiff

has here that

I think make it

5 difficult for you, without evidence and with your client not
6 being

here,

to —

to

as

far

resist

at

least

the

preliminary

7 injunction.
Now,

8

as —

as

far

as

the

security

9 concerned, I'm not — I mean, if we look at damages m

is
this

10 case and who's going to suffer the irreparable damage, on the
11

plaintiff's side, it seems to me that she's got all of the

12 issues regarding "I've been relying on the fact that I'm the
13 owner for all these years and now I'm going to be thrown out
14 on the street," and I think those are legitimate irreparable
15 damages.
His irreparable damages might be that he would lose

16

17 the opportunity t o — to sell.

We know there's a buyer out

18 there who wants to buy the property, but, on the other hand,
19 there's been a number of — b e e n a lot of interest shown m
20 property.
21

the

And so I don't think it's clear to me that — that

this has been the only — the only buyer that is going to come

22 down the aisle.

It may be that he is, but there's no evidence

23 that that would be the case at this point.
24
25 which

Other than that, his damages would be financial,
I don't

see

as

irreparable.

She

would

have

some
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1 irreparable damages if she proves her theories — I mean have
2 some

monetary

3 damages.

damages, just

like

he

would

have

monetary

So in terms of weighing those issues, I don't — I

4 don't see it tipping towards your client's side, and as far as
5 security's concerned, you may want to address that.

But I

6 think my inclination at this point would be to — to either
7 order a very nominal amount of security or none at all.
8

So with my having said that, if you could address

9 those issues and let me know what you think

I should be

10 thinking about —
11

MR. DEANS:

All right.

12

THE COURT:

— in trying to decide those questions.

13

MR. DEANS:

Hopefully, I can do it with my own

14 gallows, Your Honor, but I'll do my best to respond to your —
15

THE COURT:

You're very capable and I know, if

16 anybody could respond, you can.
17

MR.

DEANS:

And

I would

respond

in

the

most

18 respectful way that I think you've stated the problems with
19 the case.
20

I developed a sick feeling in my stomach when I came

21 into work and my secretary says, "Mr. Gomez called and he's
22 not coming."

That's obvious and I — but, doggone it, I'm

23 going to come here and do my best for a client, whether I —
24

THE COURT: And you've done very well.

I think your

25 questioning has been good, your arguments have been excellent.
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Exhibit 3

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARJEAN A DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

vs.

Case No: 040923578 PR

BERNARD GOMEZ,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
November 22, 2004

marcyt

PRESENT
Plaintiff (s) : MARJEAN A DEAKIN
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CHRISTIAN W CLINGER
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES H. DEANS
Video
Tape Number:
11:06

HEARING
TAPE: 11:06 The above-entitled case comes before the Court for
hearing on the temporary restraining order. The Court hears an
opening statement from counsel for plaintiff.
TAPE: 11:08 Marjean A. Deakin is sworn and examined.
TAPE: 12:26 Edward J. Aho is sworn and examined.
TAPE: 12:36 Plaintiff rests.
sworn and examined.

Defendant calls Jill Johnson who is

TAPE: 1:01 Defendant rests. Both sides rest. The case is argued
to the Court by respective counsel and submitted.
TAPE: 1:20 Based on the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court
grants the preliminary injunction. Plaintiff shall file a bond in
the amount of $1500 of the injunction shall be resolved.

Case No: 040923578
Date:
Nov 22, 2 0 04
This case is set for a one day bench trial on January 28, 2005 at
9:00 a.m.
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 01/28/2005
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W35
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARJEAN A. DEAKIN,
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040923578
vs.
Honorable JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
BERNARD GOMEZ,
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
Defendant.
January 3, 2005

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d c a s e comes b e f o r e t h e C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o
Rule
4 - 5 0 1 of
the
Utah
Code
of
Judicial
Administration.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o D i s m i s s h a s b e e n s u b m i t t e d f o r
decision.
Based upon t h e a r g u m e n t s of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e d o c u m e n t s i n t h e
f i l e and t h e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n h e a r i n g ,
D e f e n d a n t ' s motion i s denied without p r e j u d i c e .
DATED t h i s 3 r d

day of J a n u a r y ,

2005.
BY THE COURT,

u_

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040923578 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

NAME
CHRISTIAN W CLINGER
ATTORNEY PLA
9117 W 2700 S STE A
MAGNA, UT 84 044
JAMES H. DEANS
ATTORNEY DEF
440 South 700 East
Suite 101
SLC UT 84102-0000

&

Dated this

day of

20

T^-

(7$
^\

Deputy Court CJerk

r^ -.— ^

l^v

t
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - WV DEPT. COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARJEAN A DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,

COURT RULING

vs.

Case No: 050100573

BERNARD GOMEZ,
Defendant

Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Date: 06/03/2005

Clerk: deniseo
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that title in and of
the property described below is bereby quieted in and to MARJEAN A
DEAKIN, subject to any mortgage ixisting on the property as of the
date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of any thrd
party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or
Ramona Gomez:

Paae 1 (last)
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

MARJEAN A. DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZ|

^/#^5

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF
Case No.: 050100573
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

The above referenced case came before the Court for a bench trial on February 25, 2005.
Present at trial was Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff)
represented by and through her counsel, Christian W. Clinger, and Defendant Bernard Gomez
(hereinafter referred to as Defendant Mr. Gomez), represented by his attorney, James Deans.
Defendant Ramona Gomez (Mr. Gomez's wife) failed to appear at any of the hearings or the
trial, but was properly a party to this action and was represented by Mr. Gomez's counsel.
Hearings on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were
held in November and December 2004. The evidence admitted therein was stipulated to be
admitted for the purpose of the bench trial. After the initial issuance of the Court's Findings,
Conclusions, and Order in April 2005, Defendants moved that an amendement be made thereto
addressing Defendants' statute of limitations contentions. Argument on the Defendants' motion
was heard on June 3, 2005. These Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Order are issued in
response thereto.
The Court has heard and received the parties' stipulations of fact, the testimony of
various witnesses for the Plaintiff and the Defendants and has received into evidence the
following exhibits from the parties:
Plaintiffs Exhibits and Evidence
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff
2. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff

3. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, pictures of Plaintiff on car given by Defendant
4. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Notarized letter from Defendant transferring car to Plaintiff
5. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, copies of cancel checks evidencing mortgage payments from 1980 to
2004
6. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, Mortgage statement showing balance
7. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, Receipt and payment for new water main line
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, compilation of receipts for repairs and improvements to the duplex paid
for by Plaintiff
9. Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, November 2004 Eviction Notice
10. Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, copy of October/November 2004 mortgage payment
11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Notice to show house
12. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, copy of lease from Plaintiff
13. Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, copy of lease between Plaintiff and Tralaye Procelle
14. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 copy of audiotape of messages left on Tralaye Procelle's voicemail at
work and at home, produced with these Initial Disclosures.
15. Plaintiffs Copies of checks to Mortgage company for December 2004 mortgage and tax
payment, January 2005 mortgage and tax payment, and February 2005 mortgage and tax
payment.
Defendant's Exhibits and Evidence
1. Defendant's Exhibit 4, part of Mr. Gomez's 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns
2. Defendant's Exhibit 5, 1984 receipt from Chris & Dick's
3. Defendant's Exhibit 6, receipt for nails
Based upon the parties' stipulations, testimony, and the evidence received, the Court now
enters the following Findings of Fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In April 1977, Defendant Bernard Gomez bought the duplex located at 468 E. and 470
E. Sherman Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Plaintiff Deakin. Mr. Gomez asserted that at
an uncertain date sometime after April 1977, he added his wife's name to the title. Though
Plaintiff agrees that the Certificate of Title speaks for itself as to the names thereon, neither a
copy of the Certificate of Title nor the Mortgage was offered into evidence by the Defendants as
evidence that Mrs. Gomez's name was added to the title to the property in question. While no
evidence was introduced on this point, Mrs. Gomez appeared in this case as a party defendant
and was represented by counsel. There was no evidence submitted which would indicate that
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time materially prior to the filing of this
action, nor was any evidence submitted which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez ever took any
actions of her own which were contrary to the actions of her husband in this matter.
2. In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Plaintiff the keys to the duplex and gave her
possession and exclusive control of the house. Based on the testimony of Plaintiff, Defendant
Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers and she could do with it as she chose. Plaintiff has never
filed a Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder since 1977. Plaintiff did file and
record a Lis Pendis Notice and an Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on November 8, 2004, at the same time she commenced this lawsuit.
3. Plaintiff Deakin has continuously resided and occupied the premises located at 468 E.
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "the property"), since 1977. Since 1977, she has
openly claimed that the duplex was hers. She has told people and held out to the public that she
was the owner of the house. Plaintiffs brother, Ed Aho, testified at the Preliminary Injunction
Hearing that Plaintiff has always believed that the duplex was hers, and she has always claimed
to be the owner. Defendants have never occupied the premises.
4. In 1977, when Defendant Mr. Gomez gave the keys, possession, and exclusive
control of the duplex to Plaintiff Deakin, he told her to pay the mortgage on the duplex to the
mortgage company, pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow account, pay for all of the
improvements, pay for all of the utility bills, and so forth. Plaintiff is an unsophisticated,
uninformed, and inexperienced person when it comes to real estate and taxes. There is no
evidence that she was represented by counsel with respect to this property until this action was

commenced. Plaintiff has never claimed any deductions for the payment of property taxes or
interest on her tax returns since 1977. Plaintiff has never reported any rental income from the
duplex on her tax returns since 1977.
5. Nonetheless, for 28 years Plaintiff has paid the mortgage, paid the taxes, paid for all of
the improvements, and paid the utility bills. Plaintiff has detrimentally relied on Mr. Gomez's
commitment for 28 years. The Court received into evidence copies of checks for at least 20
years proving payment of the mortgage. In regard to the monies Plaintiff has received on the
property, Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any monies she has collected for rent on the
duplex. All monies have gone to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any
accounting for the monies collected at the duplex.
For 28 years, Defendants have never asked Plaintiff to send them any of the monies from
the duplex. Furthermore, the Defendants have never asked Plaintiff for any accounting.
6. For 28 years, Plaintiff has acted consistently with her position as owner of the
property in regard to her paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the improvements.
7. Plaintiff has asked Mr. Gomez numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in
her name as he promised. Plaintiff has followed up with Mr. Gomez in regard to putting the title
in her name, and he has responded to her, "I'll get around to it, Babe; I'll get around to it."
Plaintiff has never requested in writing that the Defendants send her a deed conveying ownership
to her. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any proposed deed for them to sign conveying the
property to Plaintiff. The reason Plaintiff never requested in writing for such a deed was that she
relied on Mr. Gomez's promises that he would get around to putting the title in Plaintiffs name.
No evidence was presented which would indicate that the parties regarded the conveyance of a
formal deed to be essential to completing the gift of the property or anything more than a mere
formality. In fact, the actions of the parties indicated to the contrary.
8. Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Plaintiff in about 1993. Plaintiff had not heard
anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's commitment until Mr. Gomez abruptly informed her through
a real estate agent on October 27, 2004, that he was planning to sell the duplex, implicitly
indicating for the first time to Plaintiff that he was taking action inconsistent with the gift. On
that date, for the first time, Defendant Mr. Gomez, through his agent, stated he wanted the
property back.
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9. Plaintiff has made the following improvements to the property: new roof, new
water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch railings for 470 E.,
torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring for 468 E. and 470
E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 468 E. and 470 E.,
new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 E. and 470 E.,
several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and 470 E., 2
stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new pipes and
drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. The Court received into evidence copies of
receipts and proof of payment of many of the improvements listed above.
Plaintiff never requested orally or in writing permission to do any repairs. This was
because she primarily relied on Mr. Gomez's statements that, because the property was hers, she
was responsible for all improvements, repairs, and the payments therefor. When Ms. Deakin did
ask on one occasion for Mr. Gomez to provide some financial help to pay for repairs or
improvements, it was her testimony that he refused because he told her that it was her house and
she could do with it as she pleased. Furthermore, in regard to tearing down the garages, the
notices from Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to tear down the garages came to Plaintiff and
not to Mr. Gomez.
10. On October 27, 2004, Plaintiff learned for the first time through Mr. Gomez's real
estate agent that he was planning to sell the duplex in question.
10. Plaintiff- not the Defendants - has rented the other side of the duplex for at least
the past 28 years. Plaintiff is currently in a lease with Tralaye Procelle.
11. On November 22, 2004, two weeks after this action was filed, Ms. Procelle received
several telephone messages from Mr. Gomez and his daughter. They both instructed Ms.
Procelle to send her monthly rental payment to Mr. Gomez and not to pay Plaintiff. There was
no evidence that such a request had been submitted to this or to any other tenant prior to
November 22, 2004.

DEFENDANT HAS ADMITTED THE FOLLOWING FACTS THROUGH HIS ANSWER
AND ADMISSIONS:
12. In 1973, Plaintiff met the Defendant, Bernard Gomez, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
13. In 1976, Mr. Gomez had talked a lot about improving Plaintiffs living conditions
and getting her out of her rental apartment. He wanted Plaintiff to have a better quality of life.
14. Mr. Gomez admitted that from 1977 to the present, there has never been any
understanding or conversation between him and Plaintiff that Plaintiff was in a lease agreement
with Mr. Gomez for the duplex in question.
15. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never had a lease agreement from 1977 to the
present with any tenant in 470 E. Sherman Ave.
16. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never personally collected any rent from the duplex.
17. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex
in question.
18. Mr. Gomez admitted that for at least the past ten years the monthly mortgage
invoices and tax notices have been sent to 468 E. Sherman Ave.
19. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid for any of the following improvements or
repairs: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch
railings for 470 E., torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring
for 468 E. and 470 E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for
468 E. and 470 E., new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468
E. and 470 E., several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and
470 E., 2 stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new
pipes and drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E.
20. From 1993 to the present, Plaintiff has not seen Mr. Gomez. They have had very
limited telephone contact.
21. Prior to the commencement of this action, the monthly mortgage invoices and the
annual payment and interest notices were mailed to 468 E. Sherman Ave.
22. Neither Mr. Gomez nor Mrs. Gomez have ever lived in or occupied the duplex.
23. For nearly 28 years, Plaintiff has leased 470 E. Sherman Ave. without any restraint
or objections from Mr. Gomez or Mrs. Gomez.
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24. Plaintiff has never been required to send Mr. Gomez the rent collected from 470 E.
Sherman, and during the past 28 years, Mr. Gomez has not asked for the rent.
25. Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Plaintiff
that he was going to sell the house. Plaintiff did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to
October 27, 2004.

TESTIMONY RECEIVED
26. Though Mr. Gomez testified that he had paid two or three monthly mortgage
payments over 28 years, he did not remember specifically when those payments may have been
made and he did not offer any documentary evidence of proof of such payments or their timing.
27. Mr. Gomez testified that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez has ever paid the property taxes
on the duplex.
28. In regard to Mr. Gomez's tax returns, Mr. Gomez testified that he has never
collected any rent from the property. However, he did report some rental income on his taxes
(for the years 2001-2004), though he did not know the monthly rental amount collected. He
merely estimated what he thought the rental income was and then reported it on those tax
returns. No tax return evidence, however, tied the income reported therein to the property in this
case.
29. In regard to improvements made to the property, Mr. Gomez testified that he has not
made or paid for any improvements to the property during at least the last ten years. He also
testified that he did not know of the improvements made by Plaintiff during at least the past ten
years because he has not visited the property during that time.
30. Mr. Gomez did testify that sometime in 1984 he made repairs to the roof of the
duplex and he offered two receipts which were received into evidence. However, the receipts do
not identify Mr. Gomez's name and there is no proof of payment. Only one of the receipts even
refers to the property's address, but the telephone number on that receipt is not that of
Defendant.
31. Prior to April 1977, and continuing thereafter until sometime prior to 1993, Plaintiff
and Defendant engaged in a prolonged romantic relationship. During that relationship, Mr.
Gomez gave Plaintiff a number of expensive gifts, including two automobiles and a ring. In
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view of the fact that the gift of the duplex was subject to a mortgage, the value of that gift was
not out of proportion to the value of the other gifts given by the Defendant Mr. Gomez to the
Plaintiff
32. In April 1977, Defendant's prior statements and prior and continuing actions led
Plaintiff to believe that Defendant had also made a gift of the real property at issue in this case
to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff acted in detrimental reliance upon those statements and actions,
reasonably believing that the property was her own property commencing in April 1977.
33. Since April 1977 Plaintiff acted consistent with her good faith belief that the
Defendant had given the property to her. Nothing in Defendants' actions until October 2004
would be contrary to such belief.
34.

For 28 years, because she believed in good faith that the Defendant had given the

property to her, Plaintiff paid the mortgage, the taxes, other bills, and the costs of the
improvements on the property.
35.

Acting in reasonable reliance upon Defendant's statement that he would "get

around to" putting title in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff never requested in writing that the
Defendant send her a deed conveying ownership to her. In further reliance upon that assurance,
Plaintiff continued to act consistently with her good faith belief that the property had been given
to her by paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, for improvements, etc.
36. Based upon all the evidence and the Court's evaluation of the demeanor and
credibility of Plaintiff and Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court further finds
based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant Mr.
Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by
Defendant Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28
years, Defendant did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 1977 and the Plaintiff
reasonably believed in good faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted in good
faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, in acting upon her belief that such a gift had been
made, the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial improvements to the property
along with paying the costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage on the property for
28 years.
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37. Further, the Court finds that revoking the gift or rescinding the gift at this time would
be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to Plaintiff who, for 28 years, has detrimentally
relied upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her by Defendant Mr. Gomez.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the Findings of Fact as stated above, the Court now enters the following
Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiff has specifically alleged the following six causes of action: 1. Quiet
Title/Adverse Possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-25-5 through 14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq.; 2.
In the Alternative, Unjust Enrichment pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Act, U.C.A. 576-1 et seq.; 3. Detrimental Reliance/Promissory Estoppel; 4. Fraud; 5. Interference with
Contract; and 6. Violation and Contempt of Court. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has prevailed on her first and third causes of action, as indicated below, it is not necessary to
address the other causes of action.
As set forth below, the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse
possession have been met by Plaintiff in that she has shown that she was given the property in
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous,
and undisturbed possession for a period of seven years or greater and that she has continuously
paid the property taxes on the property during a period exceeding seven years, and that she has
made and paid for improvements to the property.
1. Since 1977 to the present date, Plaintiff Deakin has paid substantially all mortgage
payments, paid all taxes, and made and paid for substantially all improvements and
repairs to the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. Defendants have never paid taxes for the property or made or paid for any repairs or
improvements for at least the past 10 years.
3. Defendant Mr. Gomez intended to give and indeed did make a gift of the property to the
Plaintiff in April 1977. The actions of the parties with respect to each other and with
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respect to the property since that date until October 2004 are entncly consistent with such
gift and those actions would remove the transaction from the Statute of Frauds.
4. With respect to Defendants and all others, Plaintiff has had actual, adverse, exclusive,
open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession of 468 E. and 470 E.
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah for at least the past 10 years.
5. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or exclusively occupied the premises in
question.
6. Ms. Deakin and Defendants have never been in a lease agreement for the premises in
question.
7. Defendant Mr. Gomez initially purchased the property so he could make a gift of the
property to Plaintiff. In April 1977, before changing title to the property, Defendant Mr.
Gomez in fact gave the property to Plaintiff. As between Mr. Gomez and Ms. Deakin,
the following matters, established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence,
constituted the elements of the gift: Mr. Gomez expressed his intent to give the property
to Plaintiff, he delivered the gift by presenting to her the keys to and exclusive possession
and control of the premises, and she accepted the keys and took exclusive possession and
control of the property. These facts occurred in April 1977. Plaintiff believed that the
gift occurred at that time based upon those events. Thereafter, the conduct of the parties
over 28 years reaffirmed that the gift had occurred when Mr. Gomez advised the Plaintiff
that the property was hers and when he continuously acquiesced in her on-going actions
wherein she performed consistently with the occurrence of the gift by paying the
mortgage, insurance, and taxes, collecting and keeping the rents, dealing with tenants and
the City, and arranging for and paying for significant improvements and maintenance of
the property.
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8. At all relevant times since April 1977, Plaintiff has understood in good faith reliance
upon the statements and actions of Defendant Mr. Gomez that she was the owner of the
duplex that Mr. Gomez gave her.
9. Because Plaintiff was given the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt
Lake City, Utah, and because she has had exclusive, continuous, open, notorious, and
adverse possession since 1977, and because she has paid all taxes and mortgage
payments and because she has made substantial valuable improvements to the property,
the Court concludes she is entitled under the doctrine of adverse possession to an Order
quieting title to the property in question in her, subject to any existing mortgage balance
and subject to any valid third-party lien. Neither Mr. Gomez nor anyone else ever took
any action which would constitute conduct which contradicted or breached the intent to
make a gift of the property until October 2004. Hence, no statute of limitations began to
run against Plaintiff until that time. Because Defendants took no action contrary to
Plaintiffs interest until October 2004, Plaintiffs continuing belief that Defendants would
not attempt to revoke the gift was justified until October 2004. Plaintiff timely filed this
action immediately thereafter.
10.

Defendants are equitably estopped from any action to revoke the gift and from taking any
action which may be inconsistent with said gift.

11.

The Court concludes that Ms. Deakin is the prevailing party. As such, she is entitled to
have the title in the said property quieted in her name and also to receive an award of her
costs in this action pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In view of
the fact that no deed was recorded in favor of Plaintiff Deakin, her right and interest in
and to the said property is subject to the existing first mortgage and any other valid lien
of a third party. No evidence of any such third-party lien was presented at the trial. Ms.

"?>VA

Deakm and her attorney are to prepare an affidavit of costs and suomit it to the Court and
opposing counsel pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
12

The Court concludes that because Ms Deakm has prevailed on the merits of her case, the
$1,000 00 cash bond that she deposited with the Third District Court, Salt Lake City
Department, in conjunction with the Preliminary Injunction Order, shall be released to
her

13

No award of attorneys' fees is made at this time

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that title in and to the
property described below is hereby quieted m and to MARJEAN A DEAKIN, subject to any
mortgage existing on the property as of the date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of
any third party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or Ramona Gomez

Lots 53, and 54, Block 2, WASHINGTON PLACE, a subdivision of Lots 12,
and 13, Five Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey,
Together with Vi of the vacated alley abutting on the South and East.
Tax ID No. 16-07-460-013
Commonly known as 468-470 East Sherman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115.

Dated June
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2005
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